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THE WARREN COURT AND THE PRESS
John P. MacKenzie•
conventional wisdom about the relationship between the
·warren Court and the news media runs something like this:
With a few exceptions, the press corps is populated by persons with
only a superficial understanding of the Court, its processes, and the
values with which it deals. The Court has poured out pages of legal
learning, but its reasoning has been largely ignored by a resultoriented news industry interested only in the superficial aspects of
the Court's work. The Court can trace much of its "bad press," its
"poor image," to the often sloppy and inaccurate work of news
gatherers operating in mindless deadline competition. The competition to be first with the story has been the chief obstacle in these
critical years to a better public understanding of the Court and of
our liberties and laws.
The difficulty with this Gharacterization is that it contains just
enough truth to appear reasonably complete. This picture of the
press, because it is plausible, unfortunately may actually mask difficulties that lie deeper both in the structure of complex news media
and in the Court's practices as they affect both the media and the
general public-difficulties which, if recognized, may provide some
opportunities for better understanding of the Court. If the Warren
Court has received an especially bad press, there is blame enough
to go around for it; the Court and the· press should each accept
shares of the blame, but within each institution the blame must be
reallocated.
If the ultimate histoc:y of the ·warren Court includes a judgment
that the press has been unfair to the institution, this surely ought
to be labeled as ingratitude of the highest order. New York Times
Co. v. Sullivan 1 and its progeny have carved out press freedoms to
print news without fear of libel judgments under standards more
generous and permissive to the fourth estate than the standards set
by responsible newspapers for themselves. It is well that the Court
has done so, and it is especially appropriate in a period when executive officials and political candidates have expressed mounting hostility toward the news media. Not only ideas, but men dealing in
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ideas and words, need breathing space to survive.2 These great first
amendment decisions contemplated that judges, like other public
men, would suffer considerable personal abuse and that they must
be rugged enough to take most of it,3 but the Court surely did not
mean to invite press treatment of itself that was unfair as well as
highly critical.
Before discussing what the Court and the press have done to
injure each other, it is worth noting that each has thrived somewhat
on the developing relationships of the past decade and a half. By
any definition of that elusive concept known as "news," an activist
and innovative Supreme Court makes news and thus provides grist
for the press. In turn, to an increasing degree, the press has been
expanding its resources to cope with the flow of judicial news. Thus,
the media have been giving the Court more exposure to the public.4
It must be stated, however, that the relationships between press
and Court have been complex and difficult. Some of the problems
are bui}t into the systems of both institutions. The Court begins as
a mystery, and the reporter or editor who fails to appreciate the fact
that certain things about the Supreme Court will remain unknowable and consequently unprintable simply does not understand the
situation. The Court's decisions are the start of an argument more
often than they are the final, definitive word on a given subject.
Opinions often are written in such a way that they mask the difficulties of a case rather than illuminate them. New decisions frequently cannot be reconciled with prior rulings because "policy
considerations, not always apparent on the surface, are powerful
agents of decision.'' 5
Certainly not all the turmoil of the conference room spills over
into the delivery of opinions. Secrecy at several levels both protects
and obscures the Court and its work. The process of marshalling a
Court, of compromise, of submerging dissents and concurrences, or
2. Libel plaintiffs usually sue newspapers-and not newsmen-for obvious reasons;
but the pain felt by corporations at becoming libel defendants is often communicated
to their employees.
3. See Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 V.S. 64 (1964).
4. The New York Times, The Washington Post, The Washington Star, and other
newspapers have been represented at the Supreme Court for many years, as have the
principal wire services, Associated Press and United Press International. In the past
few years the Los A.ngeles Times and the Newhouse chain of newspapers, among others,
have assigned specialist reporters to the Court. Ordinarily these reporters are also
assigned to cover the Justice Department and other legal matters.
5. Malone v. Bowdoin, 369 U.S. 643, 650 (1962) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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of bringing them about, can only be imagined or deduced by the
contemporary chronicler of the Court; history lags decades behind
with its revelations of the Court's inner workings. This is not to say
that newsmen need be privy to the Court's inner dealings, helpful
as that might be, to describe its decisions accurately and well. But
I would suggest that murky decision-reporting may be the reporting
of murky decisions as well as the murky reporting of decisions. 6
The handling of petitions for certiorari-a process replete with
elements of subjectivity and perhaps even arbitrariness-eludes the
attempts of newsmen to fathom, much less to communicate to the
general public, the sense of what the Court is doing. 7 Certiorari
action is the antithesis of what the Opinion of the Court is supposed
to represent: a reasoned judicial action reasonably explained. Yet
when the Court does speak through opinions, the press is frequently
found lacking both in capacity for understanding and capacity for
handling the material. Precious newspaper space, when it is available, often is wasted on trivia at the expense of reporting a decision's
principal message and impact. Newspapers often fail to adjust to the
abnormally large volume of material produced on a "decision day," 8
or to the task of reporting the widespread implications of a landmark decision. 9
Some of the demands made by the flow of Supreme Court news
are beyond the capabilities of all newspapers; some are beyond the
capacities of all but the newspapers most dedicated to complete
coverage of the institution. For example, the actions of the last two
6. See the discussion of Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967), in A. Cox, THE
'WAAREN COURT 43-50 (1968).
7. Editorial opinion by student law review ·writers or by journalists does not labor
under the same handicaps tha.t.beset daily news reporting. See, e.g., the caustic remarks
about Joh,1son v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719 (1966), in The Supreme Court, 1965 Term,
80 HARV. L. REv. 91, 141 (1966); MacKenzie, Equal Justice for a Lucky Few, Washington
Post, July 14, 1966, at page A 16, col. 8.
8. "Decision Monday," a tradition of opinion delivery dating back to the Civil
War, has been modified somewhat by the Court's announcement of April 5, 1965,
that henceforth it "will no longer adhere to the practice of reporting its decisions
only at Monday sessions, and that in the future they will be reported as they become
ready for decision at any session of the Court. As in the past, no announcement of
decisions to be reported will be made prior to their rendition in open Court.'' However, the phrase "any session of the Court" has meant any day the Court has met to
hear oral arguments, so that the final heavy load of a term's decisions still falls on the
Monda}S of May and June, after the oral arguments are completed.
9. The word "landmark" as applied to Supreme Court decisions should be eliminated from journalistic usage and perhaps English usage generally. Another candidate
for extinction is the phrase "in effect,'' as in "The Court ruled in effect that .•. .''
This phrase, at least as used by journalists, is nearly always followed by a mistake.
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Mondays of the October 1963 term consume all of Volume 378 of
the United States Reports. T-he decisions and orders of June 12,
1967, the final day of that term, are printed in Volume 388, which
exceeds 580 pages. Many of these decisions have remained under
advisement until the end of a term precisely because of their difficulty and complexity, elements that frequently correlate with newsworthiness. Many of them are sufficiently interesting to warrant substantial newspaper coverage, which often includes printing their full
texts or excerpts. Many decisions generate, or should generate, "sidebar" or feature stories -of their·own on the same day. Supreme Court
stories compete with each other for available column space, and all
the Court news of a given day must in turn compete with all the
other news from everywhere else in the world.
Between the Court and the press stap.ds perhaps the most primitive arrangement iri-the entire communications industry for access
to an impO!'.tant source of news material and distribution of the
information generated by that source. On days of decision delivery,
two dozen newsmen and newswomen gather in the press room on
the ground floor of the Supreme Court Building to receive opinions
in page proof form as they are delivered orally in the courtroom one
floor above. Each Justice's contribution is passed out one opinion
at a time, so that if there are, for example, several separate opinions
in a cluster of three related cases,10 the news reporter will not be
able to tell what has happened until he has assembled his entire
bundle of opinions one by one..
Upstairs in the courtroom, at a row of desks between the high
bench and the counsel's podium, sit six newsmen (several more are
seated elsewhere in the audience), three of whom represent the Associated Press, United Press International, and the Dow-Jones financial ticker. As opinions are delivered orally, Court messengers deliver printed copies to the six desks. The two wire service reporters
send their copies through pneumatic tubes to fellow workers waiting
in cubicles below. The AP reporter there, aided by an assistant, types
out his stories and dictates them over the telephone to a stenographer at the office of the service's Washington bureau. The UPI reporter does essentially the same thing, but hands his copy to a teleIO. E.g., in the related cases of A Book Named "John Cleland's Memoirs of a
Woman of Pleasure" v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413 (1966), Ginzbutg v. United States,
383 U.S. 463 (1966), and Mishkin v. New York, 383 U.S. 502 (1966), there were seventeen
separate opinions.
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type operator for direct transmission to the bureau office for editing.
Reporters for the major afternoon newspapers must devise methods
of their own for getting copy to their main offices. Reporters for
morning papers do not have "all day" to perform the same tasks,
but they have a much easier time of it at the moment of decision
delivery. For example, they need not resort to the device used by
their more time-pressed colleagues-that of preparing "canned"
stories about petitions for certiorari that are released automatically
when the Court announces its action granting or denying review.
Such articles are prepared so that they can be transmitted with the
insertion or change of a few words depending on the Court's order. 11
The Court's clerical and semiclerical workings pose problems of
their own. In the day-to-day coverage of the Supreme Court the
reporter may encounter secrecy at every stage, not all of it necessary
to the independent performance of the judicial function. There may
be secret pleadings, of which one minor but colorful example will
suffice. On December 4, 1967, the Court denied review to two topless, and by definition newsworthy, young ladies from Los Angeles,
whose petition claimed first amendment protection for their chosen
form of expression. 12 The ladies sought relief from the toils of prosecution by means of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus-a remedy
that was intriguing in itself-but had been spurned by the lower
courts. Unbeknownst to the press, which was inclined to take the
petition at face value, the Court was in receipt of a letter, actually
a responsive pleading, notifying the Justices that the defendants
were pursuing normal appellate remedies at the same time. This
information made their petition much less urgent and it might well
have chilled the press interest in the case as well as the _Court's. Only
Justice Douglas noted .his vote in favor of review. The letter was
lodged m a correspondence file, a fact which this reporter learned
by accident after his and other news stories about the case had been
printed.
There also may be secret correspondence which does not amount
to a pleading but which nevertheless may shape the outcome of a
case or materially affect the writing of an opinion. In Rees v. Peyton,13 a court-appointed attorney in a capital case communicated to
11. For a fuller discussion of the mechanics of the decision-distributing process, see
Newland, Press Coverage of the Fnited States Supreme Court, 17 W. PoL. Q. 15
(1964); D. GREY, THE SUPREME Cot'RT AND THE NEWS MEDIA (1968).
12. Bennett v. California, 389 U.S. 985 (1967).
13. 384 U.S. 312 (1966), held 0t•er until further order, 386 U.S. 989 (1967).
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the Court by letter the fact that his client wanted to dismiss his petition, a suicidal step which counsel was understandably resisting.
Again, the communication was placed in a correspondence file apart
from the remainder of the record. A request to see the correspondence was denied by the Clerk's office, initially on grounds that it
might invade the lawyer-client relationship and later on no grounds
at all. At length the letter was released. Similarly, it might be noted
that the celebrated communication from J. Edgar Hoover, Director
of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, regarding FBI interrogation
practices-one which figured importantly in the Chief Justice's opinion in Miranda v. A rizona14-has not been made public despite
requests for access to it.
There may also be secret exhibits, such as the one requested
from the bench by the Chief Justice in Gites v. Maryland, 1rs which
may prove decisive in a case. There may even be secret petitions for
certiorari in a controversy not involving national security; this
occurred recently in a bitterly fought domestic relations case from
Maryland.16 And, -although the Court's press room is supposed to have
available all briefs that are filed, the word "filed" is a term of art
meaning "accepted for filing with the Court." This excludes many
papers which the Justices see, including many amicus curiae briefs
lodged with the Court pending its disposition of a motion for leave
to file when one or both parties has objected to the filing. The
"deferred appendix" method authorized by the 1967 revisions in the
Supreme Court's rules17 means that more major briefs will be formally on file with the Court in proof form; however, the briefs,
while available for inspection if the fact of filing is known to the
news reporter, do not become available generally until later when
printed copies are delivered to the Court.
In what way, then, have these ingredients-the nature of the
Court's work, the lack of capacity on the part of the press, and the
Com:t's own administrative habits-combined to influence the public's view of the Supreme Court? Examples abound in which the
principal cause of public confusion must be laid to one or another
14. 384 U.S. 436, 483-86 (1966). The author does not claim that the Hoover correspondence or that of Solicitor General Marshall contains anything not summarized
in the opinion.
15. 386 U.S. 66, 74-80 (1967).
_ 16 •. In re Malmstedt, 385 U.S. 976 (1966), denying certiorari and granting respon•
dent's motion to "seal the records and preserve anonymity."
17. See, e.g., Rule 36, 388 U.S. 967.
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of these elements.18 The examples are to be found primarily in the
areas of deepest controversy: race relations, use of confessions in
criminal cases, reapportionment, obscenity, and religion. 19
In the area of the Warren Court's central achievement, the promotion of equal treatment for racial minorities, the Court must take
some share of the blame for the bad press it received. One source of
difficulty was the famous footnote 11 in Brown v. Board of Education, 20 which cited "modem authority" as to the state of psychological
knowledge about the detrimental effects of state-imposed segregated
education. The importance of the gratuitous footnote was emphasized out of all proportion by segregationists, and at least by hindsight it seems to have been inevitable that this should be so. The
press contributed to the difficulty not so much by misreporting the
opinion as by failing to muster the depth of understanding to place
the footnote in perspective by comparing "modern authority" with
the amateur sociology used by the nineteenth century Court.21
In the field of criminal law, another area in which the ,,varren
Court has made headlines, one may again see the difficulty of attributing blame. As with civil rights, it is virtually certain that most
members of the general public literally know about the Supreme
Court's work in this area only what they have read in the newspapers,
18. Accusations of slanted reporting pure and simple are beyond the intended scope
of this discussion, partly because, while the Court may have suffered in peculiar ways
from press bias, it is not unique among governmental institutions as a victim.
Unquestionably, one might cite examples such as the contrasting ways in which the
controversial labor case, Textile Workers v. Darlington Co., 380 U.S. 263 (1965), was
described at the time of oral argument. Compare N.Y. Times, Dec. 10, 1964, at 46,
col. 4 ("The right of management to terminate a business operation on grounds of
its own choosing was confronteci by its most direct legal challenge in the Supreme
Court today.') with N.Y. Times, Dec. 10, 1964, at 54, col. 4 ("As framed in proceedings before the National LabQ.r. Relations Board, the case before the Court did not
present the basic question of a company's desire to go out of business altogether.
The issue was, rather, the right to close one unit in a multi-unit enterprise.")
19. See, e.g., the discussion of the public school prayer and Bible-reading cases
and the press treatment of them in J. CLAYTON, THE MAKING OF JUSTICE 15-23 et passim
(1964).
20. 347 U.S. 483, 494-95 (1954).
21. A journalist has placed the footnote in better perspective. See A. LEWIS, PORTRAIT OF A DECADE 15-31 (1964). The sequels to Brown, which opened other areas of
government action and human experience to scrutiny under the equal protection
clause, were no less susceptible of misunderstanding and speculation in the press.
The use of per curiam opinions to deal with segregation in parks, swimming pools,
and the like has been commented upon for years by legal specialists. E.g., H. WECHSLER, PRINCIPLES, POLITICS OF FUND/I.MENTAL LAW 31 (1961). The fact that academicians
registered complaints and expressed confusion months and years later ought to give
some comfort to the newsmen who tiied to explain these orders to the public the
same day they were issued.
-
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heard, on the radio, or seen on television. Mixed though the picture
may be, it has become clear at least to this ,vriter that press misinterpretation of Escobedo,22 l\1.iranda,23 and Wade, 24 to name several of
the most controversial decisions, has not been the fault of the
"regular" reporters at the Supreme Court, whether writers for wire
services or daily newspapers. These decisions probably were reported
more accurately under the deadline pressure of decision day than
they have been reported since that time.
In Escobedo, for example, it was widely and correctly reported
at the time of decision that the suspect's incriminating statements
had been ruled inadmissible because he had been denied access to
counsel who had already been retained and who was figuratively
beating on the interrogation room door while the petitioner was
being questioned in disregard of his express wish to consult his lawyer. Since his release from the murder charge against nim, Danny
Escobedo has been embroiled with the law many times; finally, in
1968, he was convicted on federal criminal charges. Yet, in most of
the news accounts about the later life of Danny Escobedo, the
Court's initial decision has been described as one which threw out
his confession on grounds that police refused to let him see "a lawyer."25 Miranda may have mooted the distinction, at least for trials
starting after June 13, 1966, but surely the fact that Escobedo was
denied permission to consult a previously retained attorney makes
a difference to an evaluation of the situation that confronted the
now-notorious petitioner. Given the actual factual setting, the ruling
seems less based on a "technicality" 26 or excessive solicitude for a
criminal.
Fairness demands acknowledgment that ,vriters of subsequent
news reports dealing with any Supreme Court decision may them22. Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
23. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
24. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
25. See, e.g., Washington Post, Feb. 21, 1968, at A21, col. 1 (Associated Press dispatch); editorial, Huntington Herald-Dispatch (\V. Va.), quoted in 114 CONG. REc.
1236 (daily ed. Feb. 14, 1968).
26. "Technicality" is another term that should be eliminated from the journalist's
vocabulary. In newspaper usage the term, properly translated, usually means that
the reporter did not understand the basis for the decision or considered it too complicated for the reader. But "technicality" is actually a loaded word. Justice Frankfurter ~xtolled procedural safeguards as the basis of liberty, while Senator Thurmond
of South Carolina berated Justice Fortas for the Court's decision in Mallory v. United
States -[354 U.S. 449 (1957)] which he described as the use of "technicalities." Hearings
on the Nominations of Abe Fortas and Homer Thornberry Before the Senate Comm.
on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 191 (1968).
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selves be working under considerable deadline pressure, and usually
they suffer from the added handicap of not having immediate access
to the written texts of the Court's opinions. An after-dinner speaker
may opine that the Supreme Court would throw out the confession
of a man who walked up to a policeman on a street corner and told
him of a crime he had just committed. The speaker might also say,
as indeed members of the United States Senate were fond of saying
during the battle over the nomination of Justice Fortas to replace
Chief Justice Warren, that the Court "has made it impossible
to prohibit or punish the showing of indecent movies to children."27
What does the reporter do when confronted by such statements
while on an otherwise routine assignment to cover the speech? His
only source of help may be the newspaper's legal correspondent, if
there is one and if he is sufficiently knowledgeable in such matters;
the legal correspondent may be able to furnish information for a
brief statement in the story, telling, for the benefit of the uninformed
reader, what the Court actually did or said.
Inaccuracies of this nature are not the product solely of newspapers which are short on resources and reporting personnel or lack
a regular correspondent at the Supreme Court. For example, The
New York Times printed an editorial summarizing a number of
post-Miranda confession rulings in the courts of New York. The
editorial deplored the release of the confessed murderer of his wife
and five children who was "freed under the rules laid down by the
United States Supreme Court."28 The newspaper came close to pinpointing the problem that the case presented. The defendant's confession had been elicited before the date of the Miranda decision
but his trial occurred afterward. The editorial stated:
These confessions feii into a twilight zone that unpredictably
blanketed defendants under charges and awaiting trial when the
Supreme Court decided the landmark Miranda case last June. In
an unusual-and, in our judgment, unwise-protective innovation,
the Court applied retroactively to these defendants its mandate for
notice to all newly arrested suspects of their rights to counsel.29

The rule of Miranda's companion case of Johnson v. New ]ersey 30
27. See remarks of Senator Long of Louisiana, 114- CONG. R.Ec:. 11,340 (daily ed. Sept.
25, 1968). Such statements ignored the decision in Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S.
629 (1968).
28. N.Y. Times, Feb. 23, 1967, at 34, col. I.
29. Id.
30. 384 U.S. 719 (1966).
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was indeed an "innovation," but not because of its lenity. It was in
fact an unprecedented limitation of the retroactive effect of a constitutional ruling, more severely restricting Miranda's application to
past cases than even the fairly recent decisions limiting the retroactive impact of Mapp v. Ohio 81 and Griffin v. California. 32 In fact,
there was confusion about this point later in Congress. Much of the
legislative response to Miranda expressed in Title II of the Omnibus
Safe Streets and Crime Control Act of 196833 appears to have been
based on press reports about accused persons who benefited from the
very limited retroactive impact of that decision.84 That is, the accused came to trial after June 13, 1966-the date Miranda was
decided-and the pros·ecution could not use the incriminating statements already elicited in violation of the Miranda rules. Although
these examples were offered by the Sen·ate critics of Miranda to show
that police would be hopelessly "handcuffed" in selving crimes, they
were inapposite for that purpose. A fair test ot the decision's impact
could come, if at all, only in subsequent cases when the police
attempted to solve crimes with full knowledge of the constitutional
31. 367 U.S. 643 (1961). In Johnson, the applicability of Miranda was limited to
those cases which came to trial after the date on which the Miranda decision was
rendered by the Court. 384 U.S. at 721. In contrast, Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618
(1965), held that the exclusionary rule announced in Mapp was inapplicable only to
those cases ~n which the conviction had become final before Mapp was decided. 381
U.S. at 620. A conviction was defined as final "where the judgment of conviction was
rendered, the availability of appeal exhausted, and the time for petition for certiorari
had elapsed" before the Court's decision in Mapp. 381 U.S. at 622 n.5. The Court
did not disturb prior decisions which- had applied Mapp to cases which were still
pending on direct review at the date Mapp was rendered although the trial had been
held prior to the Mapp decision 381 U.S. at 622.
32. 380 U.S. 609 (1965). In Tehan v. Shott, 382 U.S. 406 (1966), the Court announced
a rule containing the same restrictions on the retroactive application of Griffen as
those imposed by Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965), on the retroactivity of
Mapp. See note 31 supra. Subsequently the Court has cut back itself more severely on
the retroactivity of a new constitutional ruling. See Fuller v. Alaska, 37 U.S.L.W. 3157
(Oct. 28, 1968), holding that the exclusionary rule of Lee v. Florida, 392 U.S. 378, 3158
(1968), "is to be applied only to trials in which the evidence is sought to be introduced
after the date of our decision in Lee" (emphasis added). The most &evere restriction on
retroactivity, of course, occurred in Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967), applying new
safeguards on police identification procedures only to cases involving confrontation for
identification purposes that occurred after the date of the decision in United States v.
Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967), and Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 26!1 (1967). All this belttightening on the part of the Court took place, of course, too late to spare it the
political criticism it received from reporters during the debate on the Omnibus Crime
Control bill and the Fortas nomination.
33. Pub. L. N'o. 90-351 (June 19, 1968).
34. See, e.g., 114 CONG. REc. 3329 (daily ed. April 25, 1968) (remarks of Senator
Tydings). See note .31 supra.
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warning and waiver requirements and when the courts began to
apply the new rules to cases that had been investigated under them.
Like the Escobedo decision, Miranda has suffered more in subsequent news treatment than it did in the initial reporting of the
case. The "spot stories" that were handled by on-the-scene Supreme
Court specialists made reasonably clear the Court's stated reasons for
the new safeguards for criminal suspects. Many of them mentioned
that station-house questioning was deemed "inherently coercive" and
required at least the limited protection of a police warning of the
accused's rights. Many of them mentioned Chief Justice Warren's
citation of FBI practice as evidence that, in the majority's view,
police could "live with" the new requirements. Most accounts carefully noted the citation of police training manuals as evidence that
psychological coercion had replaced physical force as a means of
defeating the individual's privilege against compulsory self-incrimination. Most of these elements, which had given depth and meaning
to the spot stories, were missing from later accounts that were
stripped to the barest bones of the ruling, often necessarily so, because of the demands of space and the structure of the articles.
These, then, are some of the components of the massive communications failure that grew worse as the Warren era drew to a
close, or rather, as the era tried to draw to a close with the attempt
of the Chief Justice to retire. At the last, the critics of the Court
drowned out, with their cries of "law and order" and slogans about
"handcuffing the police," both the principles underlying the Court's
unpopular decisions and the very existence of some rulings that
should have been more popular.35
One of the crowning ironies of the recent confirmation struggle
was that the stated reason for the last-minute defection of Senate
Minority Leader Everett M. Dirksen from the supporters of the
.

35. E.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. l (1968) (upheld a criminal conviction based on
evidence obtained through a "stop and frisk" even though the police officer did not
have probable cause for arrest); Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968) (upheld a
state statute prohibiting sale of obscene material to minors even though sale of the
same material could be made to adults); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967)
(indicated that evidence obtained by an electronic listening device pursuant to a carefully circumscribed court order would be admissible); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294
(1967) (reversed a lower court order in a criminal trial which barred as "mere
evidence" defendant's clothing seized during a search of his house, and held that the
"mere evidence" distinction was no longer viable; thus, a lawful search is no longer
limited to the "fruits and instrumentalities" of the crime). I do ·not concede that
the press gave these decisions too little attention at the time they were rendered.
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nomination of Abe Fortas to be Chief Justice was the decision of
the Court in Witherspoon v. Illinois3 6 and its anticipated impact on
the case of Richard Speck, the condemned murderer of eight Chicago nurses.37 In Witherspoon, the Court vacated a death sentence
imposed by a "stacked" jury from which veniremen had been automatically eliminated when they expressed reservations about imposing the death penalty. Witherspoon is a decision which, unless
I seriously misread it, is grounded in significant part on a Gallup
Poll estimate of contemporary attitudes toward capital punishment.38
The failure of communications, so at odds with the Court's necessary function as a constitutional teacher, had worthy origins. The
school desegregation cases would doubtless have been excoriated by
segregationists no matter what form of words the Court had chosen,
and segregationist officials clearly would have defied the rulings just
as vigorously. Perhaps Brown v. Board of Education, besides being
a catalyst for other constitutional breakthroughs, set the pattern for
the Warren Court's judicial conduct in the face of conservative
hostility. The Court sent the message out that segregation was unlawful; the message came back that unlawfulness would persist in
parts of the land; and the Court became determined to do whatever
justice it could on its own. Similarly, in the criminal law field, Earl
Warren and some of his colleagues ultimately expressed doubts that
the Court could issue a constitutional exclusionary rule that would
be effective in actual police practice; 39 however, they undertook to
lay down the rules anyway, although quite possibly the Justices were
conditioned to some disappointment about the level of compliance.
Under Chief Justice Warren significant advances were made in
the techniques of communicating the Court's work to the public,
although the advances were outstripped by events. Starting soon after
Brown, the press at its best began to reach new levels of competence.
The Court made the press' job a bit easier by meeting at ten a.m.
instead of at noon. The Association of American Law Schools began
a helpful program of issuing background memoranda for the press
on major cases which had been argued before the Court. The Court
36. 391 U.S. 510 (1968).
37. ll4 CONG. R.Ec. 11687-88 (daily ed. Oct. 1, 1968)(Remarks of Senator Dirksen
explaining his vote against cloture).
38. See 391 U.S. at 520.
39. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 4-7 (1968). See the interpretation of the stop-and-frisk
cases advanced in La Fave, "Street Enco1Lnters" and the Constitlltion; Terry, Sibron,
Peters, and Beyond, 67 MICH. L. REv. 39, 59·60 (1968).
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also began to space out the delivery of some of its opinions. Some.
often-mentioned experiments were not tried, however-most notably
the proposal to supply the press with opinions a few hours in advance of delivery in order to give reporters time to compose more
careful articles. Apparently the deterrent has been fear that some
decisions, especially important economic ones, might be compromised by early release no matter what precautions were taken by the
short-handed Court staff. The experiment should be tried anyway,
if necessary with the specific exclusion of such economic cases. In
the future, the Court must also seriously consider some rapprochement with television and re-examination of its ban on cameras in
the courtroom. Television will certainly not invest money, manpower, and air time to cover a subject that will not reward the
medium pictorially, and more and more Americans seem to receive
all or most of their news over that medium.
During his confirmation hearings, Justice Fortas offered in broad
outline a mixture of proposals for study of many of these problems.40
He mentioned the already-accomplished revision of the "Decision
Monday" procedure41 and noted that the burden on the press had
been relieved somewhat but perhaps could be relieved more. He
suggested expanding the Association of American Law Schools'
project (now supported by the American Bar Foundation), which
supplies helpful memoranda about most of the argued cases to the
press at the time of argument, to the post-decision phase of the
Court's work.42 He also recommended that statistical information
be compiled for newsmen; as an example of a little-reported fact, he
cited the results of a survey showing that 92 or 93 per cent of all
criminal cases presented to the Court for review during the October
1967 term had been rejected. 43 He commended the formation of
40. Letter from Abe Fortas to Chairman Eastland of the Senate Judiciary Committee, Hearings, supra note 27, at 253.
41. See note 8 supra.
42. A brief experiment relating to the announcement of decisions was tried in 1965,
whereby a law teacher from the \Vashington, D.C., area was available to newsmen in
the press room. This practice was abandoned when it became apparent that the reporters were too busy making their own analyses and writing their own stories to
consult with the expert in residence. Leaders in the AALS project began discussion
late in 1968 of the possibility of additional, post-decision memoranda that could be
distributed within a week or so of major decisions.
43. Several newsmen saw this as an unfelicitous example of the value of increased
information services. Most of the reporters are fully aware of this sort of statistic and
many have reported routinely that only about one in twenty petitioners ever wins
review. The dangers of "news management" are apparent but they are far over the
horizon.
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an organization of practitioners before the Court. And, he suggested
coming to grips with .the pressing problems of radio and television
coverage.
Perhaps Justice Fortas will help to implement some of these
general ideas, though not, of course, as Chief Justice. His sympathetic concern for the problems of the press, and similar feelings on
the part of other members of the Court, have been evident. The
cornerstone for constructing any improvements is that the Supreme
Court must be an open institution-as open as is truly consistent
with proper adjudication and as open as the democratic society the
Warren Court sought so earnestly to fashion.

